What If...
What if Great Britain didn't intercept the Zimmerman Telegram?
The final aim of the war is pursued by all armies simultaneously, and we therefore have to consider the full extent of everything that has happened, or might have happened.... A great many assumptions have to be made about things that did not actually happen but seemed possible, and that, therefore, cannot be left out of account.
--Carl von Clausewitz, On War
As I look at recent “peace” proposals offered to Ukraine by Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and their mouthpieces, I searched my memory for anything in American history that would help our people understand Ukraine’s perspective when asked to surrender one-fifth of their national territory to sate Putin’s imperial ambition and Trump’s vanity. I think the best example goes back to 1917 and the months before the United States entered the Great War, or World War One as we call it today. I refer to the Zimmerman Telegram affair.
What was the Zimmerman Telegram?
By late 1916, The Great War was at a stalemate along the Western Front. On the Eastern front, Russia's forces were collapsing but some elements stubbornly fought on. On the war's southern flank, Austria-Hungary and Italy were trapped in their own frozen war. Great Britain’s naval blockade of Germany was taking its toll and Germany was regretting an earlier decision to suspend unrestricted submarine warfare, made largely in response to American anger over the 1915 Lusitania sinking, which took 198 American lives.
In Berlin, voices for renewing unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic were winning out over those who cautioned it would bring the United States into the war as allies of the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France, Russia). Within Germany's Foreign Ministry, voices opposing renewal lost out. Arthur Zimmerman rose to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replacing a predecessor who resigned over the shift in policy. Zimmerman was considerably more amenable to renewing unrestricted Submarine Warfare and on January 31st, 1917, his office informed the United States Germany would resume unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1st. Zimmerman hoped the United States would maintain its neutrality and keep its vessels out of harm’s way. President Woodrow Wilson felt angry and betrayed, indicating he no longer trust Germany’s word. But, although the memory of the Lusitania rankled along with this new insult, neither Wilson or America were ready to go to war. Wilson had, after all, been reelected three months before on the platform—and promise—of “he kept us out of war.”
But what if the United States did abandon its neutral stance? Well, Zimmerman had already put a plan in motion for that.
In January 1917, Zimmerman sent a secret telegram to the German Ambassador in Mexico City. The telegram instructed Ambassador Heinrich von Eckhardt to extend an offer to the Mexican Government; an alliance, should the United States enter the war against Germany
We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare… We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.
Zimmerman also instructed von Eckhardt to propose Mexico invite Japan--then allied with the Triple Entente--to change sides and also declare war on the United States.
The proposal wasn't as preposterous as it might seem looking back from today’s vantage point. Zimmerman knew relations between Mexico and the United States had soured since 1915. President Wilson’s early enthusiasm for Mexican President Venustiano Carranza had waned and he declined to officially recognize Carranza’s government, which was embroiled in a three-way civil war with Emilio Zapata in the south and Pancho Villa in the north. When Villa tried to pull the United States into the war by attacking Columbus, New Mexico in early 1916, Wilson dispatched General Pershing to Mexico to capture Villa and destroy his force. Pershing’s pursuit of Villa brought American troops into contact with Mexican government forces and the ensuing battle brought the two countries to the verge of war. In November 1916, Carranza told Germany that Mexico could “to the extent of its powers in certain circumstances” help German submarines operating in the Gulf of Mexico.
As far as Japan was concerned, tensions had increased during the previous decade over which country would be the dominant power in the Pacific. Moreover, Japan was angry over America’s restrictive immigration policies against Japanese. Zimmerman hoped to exploit those tensions to pry Japan away from its alliance with the Triple Entente and to aim them at the Americans.
Would it have worked? On paper, the United States had a larger and better equipped army than Mexico. But Mexico’s army was battle hardened from seven years of civil war and were led by competent officers who had studied strategy and tactics of Europe’s armies and incorporated that knowledge into their own concept of waging war. Moreover, they’d acquired modern equipment from Europe. Mexico might not defeat the United States in a protracted war, but they could do enough damage to keep American forces out of Europe.
What Zimmerman didn’t know—what no one outside a select few in the British government and Royal Navy knew—was that British code-breakers were able to read German Foreign Ministry coded messages. Within minutes of Zimmerman sending the cable, British code-breakers in Room 40 in the Admiralty were at work decrypting it. It took the code-breakers considerably longer to develop a plausible scenario that didn't reveal their code-breaking operation than it took to decrypt and read the cable.
Once decrypted the cable was sent to the British Ambassador in Washington DC, who delivered it to the American Secretary of State on February 24th. When it arrived at the White House, there was outrage aplenty, although President Wilson wasn’t quite ready to retaliate by seeking a declaration of war. He had his campaign promise about keeping out war to consider, and wasn’t sure the telegram was enough to motivate the public to want to go to war. He also needed to explain how the British got the telegram, and the British were still refining their alibi.
The news of the telegram was released to the American public on March 1st, 1917 and the anger and betrayal was almost all the British, and hawkish members of Congress and Wilson’s cabinet, could hope for. But not quite; outrage in the southwestern United States was intense, it was less so in the Midwest, with a large German population, and where a “peace party” led by Wisconsin Senator Robert LaFollette, was strongest. Anger over the Zimmerman Telegram abated somewhat when Carranza—doubtless realizing any potential advantage of surprise was lost—abjured any intention of going to war. Still, over the course of March, American opinion marinated in growing anger over Zimmerman’s telegram as well as German submarine attacks on American ships. Sentiment in the northeast and along the Atlantic coast favored Britain and France all along, and hardened into pro-war demands. By the end of March, opinion in Congress reflected the public shift and insisted Germany be punished. On April 2nd, President Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany and its allies. By April 6th, both houses voted to declare war.
What if the British had never intercepted Zimmerman’s telegram?
As noted, by the time the Telegram was made public, Mexico’s president denied any intention to attack the United States. Would he have done so if secrecy had been maintained? Or would he have held his options open and discussed possible strategies with Berlin and Tokyo? Had Carranza considered the proposal at all, he and Berlin would have had to negotiate a strategic hurdle. Berlin’s goal was to keep American forces out of Europe. Carranza would not have wanted to face a United States at full strength, preferring to engage America with its strength substantially occupied elsewhere. The “sweet-spot,” if there was one, would be in waiting for the bulk of American troops to set sail for Europe and then strike.
Would Germany keep its end of the bargain? That question may have weighed on Carranza’s decision to decline the Zimmerman offer. While Germany pledged to “make war together” against the United States, it wasn't in their strategic interest to actually make war against the United States, but for Mexico to do so. Could Germany actually afford “generous financial support” to Mexico? By March of 1917, it looked as if Germany might knock Russia out of the war, letting them move their forces from the eastern front to end the stalemate in the west. If that scenario played out, Berlin likely could afford to help Mexico prosecute war with the United States, financially.
So lets say that the Zimmerman’s telegram remained secret but the United States, smarting from Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare, declared war. Carranza decided to take the gamble and persuaded Germany to agree with Mexico attacking once the bulk of American forces had embarked for France, at which time German submarines would attempt to sink as many of American troop ships as possible. Mexican force would cross into Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona striking rail lines, towns, and military installations. And, if all went well Japan would attack American possessions in the western Pacific.
In June 1917, 14,000 American troops sailed for France. They arrived untrained and were sent to training camps where they would spend the next four months before entering combat. Many thousands more would follow. Had Mexico’s army attacked the United States that summer, with American troops in transit to Europe, it is quite possible they could have seized parts or all of Arizona and New Mexico and a good part of western Texas. The impact in the United States might pale compared to the effect in Europe where, as newly arrived American troops would be withdrawn to deal with the emergency at home, already exhausted British and French forces might well collapse and their governments sue for peace. In any ensuing negotiations concerning Mexico and the United States, Germany would honor their commitment to Mexico, at least to the extent of insisting on freezing borders where they were left at the end of fighting.
Imagine, in 1918, Germany and Mexico demanding—and Great Britain and France demurring—the United States return lands purchased or taken from Mexico 70 years before, or at least surrender lands occupied by Mexican forces at that point in time. Imagine a border frozen in conflict, or a demilitarized zone on our southern border; how intolerable it would be for those living in lost lands and their families.
Imagine Ukraine.